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Abstract
Vagueness does not necessarily come in with vague predicates, nor
need it be expressed by them1, but undoubtedly 'vague predicates' are
traditionally in the focus of main stream discussions of vagueness. In
her current modal logic presentation and discussion of the Sorites para-
dox Susanne Bobzien[1] lists among the properties of a Sorites series a
rather weak modal tolerance principle governing the 'grey zone' contain-
ing the borderline cases of the Sorites series, which later proves crucial
for her solution of the Sorites paradox by use of epistemic interpreted
modal operators in 1st order modal logic. We suggest (for different re-
search interest) instead a non-modal description of the switch in the grey
zone (respecting tolerance), by resort to similarity sequences, thus getting
tangent to two other areas of research in the field. Let's say - any way -
the Sorites paradox vanishes, the Sorites series does not.
1 Introduction
Bobzien's exposition of 'A generic solution to the Sorites paradox...' - which we
would like to cite as our 'Sorites' frame of reference - starts
"A Sorites series w.r.t. some given predicate F is (i) a finite sequence of
objects a1 to an that is ordered with respect to some dimension (e.g. height,
numbers of grains), with the ordering being total and strict,1 for which (ii)
the principle POLAR and (iii) the principle MONOTONICITY◻ hold, and
which (iv) displays tolerance.", and Bobzien states as formal properties
"2.1  Fa1 ∧  ¬ Fan POLAR"
...
"2.2 ∀i ((Fai → Fai−1) ∧ (¬Fai → ¬Fai+1)) MONOTONICITY◻"
...
"2.3 ∃i (¬Fai ∧ ¬ ¬Fai)↔ ¬∃i (Fai ∧¬Fai)BORDERLINE −AS −BUFFER"
...
"2.4 ∀i ¬ ¬ (Fai ↔ Fai+1) TOLERANCE¬◻¬"
Bobzien [1], 2, pp. 3-5
Reference to the epistemic interpretation of e.g. ∃i `Fai which assures the
existence of borderline cases (agnostic point of view) allows Bobzien to account
for liability to the fallacy; the fallacy diagnosed to be caused by acceptance
of plausible but invalid Sorites 'induction' Conditional (SC), which Bobzien
consequently replaces by a 'weakened Conditional (WC)' [1], 8, pp. 21 ff.
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We agree to rejecting the Sorites 'induction', but being interested mainly
in some special location of the landscape of supposedly vague predicates, in
which the Sorites chose to reside, for now we leave Bobzien's exposition at this
point. And, using to a different purpose2 different means, we try another way
describing and replacing Sorites 'induction' by a weaker principle in non-modal
context.
2 similarity
2.1 similarity relation vs. equivalence relation
We recall elementaries from the logic of binary relations:
A binary relation E is an equivalence relation iff E is reflexive ⋀xExx,
symmetric ⋀xy (Exy → Eyx) and transitive ⋀xyz (Exy ∧Eyz→ Exz)
In every 1st order language L containing identity, the identity relation is the
strongest equivalence relation expressible in L, which is reflected by 'substitution
salva veritate' axiom schemes or inference rule, e.g. by an axiom scheme⋀xy[x = y → (Ax→Ay)]
where Ax is any first order condition with free occurrence of some variable
x not containing variable y.
Weaker equivalence relations than identity are common e.g. in (axiomatic)
basic measurement (objects measured may show equal length or mass etc.) 3
Any equivalence relation scatters its domain into a set of mutually disjunct
equivalence classes.
Just another case with similarity: A binary similarity (or resemblance, likeness)
relation S should be reflexive ⋀x Sxx , symmetric ⋀xy (Sxy → Syx), but need
not be transitive.
Thus, models for a similarity relation in this sense may include structures in
which¬[⋀xyz (Sxy ∧ Syz→ Sxz)] is true, which is equivalent to⋁xyz (Sxy ∧ Syz ∧ ¬Sxz)
Of course, the conditions of reflexivity and symmetry do not define a special
similarity relation but a set of such relations, in fact a set, which contains the
set of all equivalence relations as a subset - viz. the set of those similarity
relations, which are transitive; in other words, this concept of similarity relation
is a generalization of the concept of equivalence relation.
2.2 similarity relation vs. equivalence relation - modeling
A rather simple but instructive set of models for these axioms for S (reflexive,
symmetric and maybe or not transitive, in different models, or for different
instances within the same model) is given by sets of line segments of some
constant length (in Euclidean space)
U ⊂ {< x,y > ∣ 0 < d (x,y) = const.} 4
containing some, say at least 3, line segments of equal length and mutually
different directions and the set U of line segments is closed under parallel and
under linear translations.
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Definition: < x1,y1 > is called similar to < x2,y2 > , iff there exists a (possi-
bly empty) set of translations such that x1 = x2 = x ∧ d (y1,y2) ≤ d < x,y1 >
. Obviously this is the case, iff ∢ < y1,x,y2 > ≤ 60° .
It's very easy now to define models for our 'similarity relation' S, containing
3 line segments < x1,y1 >,< x2,y2 >,< x3,y3 > such that
line segment < x1,y1 > is similar to line segment < x2,y2 > , and
line segment < x2,y2 > is similar to line segment < x3,y3 > and
line segment < x1,y1 > is not similar to line segment < x3,y3 > .
In this case the set of all line segments, similar to line segment < x1,y1 >
and the set of all line segments similar to < x3,y3 > (which does not contain< x1,y1 >) do have a non-empty intersection, containing < x2,y2 >, which case
were excluded, if S were transitive.
2.3 similarity by degree ?
Of course, by varying the similarity definition x1 = x2 = x ∧ d (y1,y2) ≤ d < x,y1 >
in the second conjunct we would be able to introduce additionally 'similarity to
a certain degree r ∈ [0,1] ⊂ IR ' , by setting
similarity = 1 ⇋ ∢ < y1,x,y2 > = 0° , giving d (y1,y2) = 0
similarity = 0 ⇋ ∢ < y1,x,y2 > = 90° , giving d (y1,y2) = d (x,y1) ×√2
We suggest, that this model class for 'similarity to a certain degree' supplies
a metric for T. Williamson's (T1)-(T5)5
But this extends to a larger topic while we focus on the current context,
keeping for the time being to our simple nonmetric similarity-relation(s) S (x,y)
2.4 similarity relation vs. equivalence relation - use in
Sorites series
The idea of dropping transitivity for achieving a plausible weak Sorites 'induc-
tion' principle seems to have been introduced first by Robert van Rooij and ex-
tensively elaborated in Pablo Cobreros et alii, 'Tolerance_Classical_Strict'(TCS)
"Central to the discussion of this principle is the specification of the properties
of the indifference relation. Arguably, a relation such as  not looking to have
distinct heights is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive: a can look to
have nearly the same height as b, b can look to have nearly the same height
as c, but a and c may look to have distinct heights. In our approach, the
non-transitivity of the indifference relation is a central feature of all vague pred-
icates ..."[2] p.349 "Definition 8 Similarity predicates .... That is, similarity
predicates are classically interpreted,... Essentially, the assumption implies that
similarity relations coming with a vague predicate are crisp and extensionally
determinate. This may appear to be in tension with the prospect of accounting
for vague predicates, but for the theory we develop here what primarily matters
is the non-transitive character of such relations." [2] p.353
Our approach to similarity relations, which need not be transitive (while
being rather shortcut and independently found), seems to be in good accord
with this policy, but, differing from TCS we confine to classical FOL so far.6
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2.4.1 preliminary conclusion
Now, it seems, that by our roughly sketched similarity approach
( S (ai,ai+1) meaning 'ai is similar to ai+1 with respect to being F' )
F (a1) ∧ S (a1,a2) ∧ ... ∧ S (ai−1,ai) ∧ S (ai,ai+1) ∧ ¬S (ai−k[k<i],ai+1) ∧ ¬F (ai+1) ...
the Sorites paradox has vanished, the Sorites series remaining untouched.
Really ? Of course, with respect to our 'line segments models' there is nothing
surprising left with ¬S (ai−1,ai+1) , nothing paradox. But what about the
'grey ...' or 'borderline zone' ? Has it gone ? Then, according to Bobzien's
characterisation we would retain only a PM-series (POLAR-MONOTONICITY-
series), not a Sorites series, which by definition contains borderline cases. The
truth of course is - if there are borderline cases, they remain, independently of
what logical features we use to describe them. Our simple similarity chaining
S (ai,ai+1) [in the case of a Sorites series necessarily by a similarity relation,
which admits non-transitive instances] might be able to detect the switch to the
first clear case ¬Fai+1 (marking the end of the grey zone), but the start of the
'grey zone' is of course not marked. The start of the 'borderline zone' (as leaving
clear cases of F) would only be marked, if we had at our disposal the equivalence
relation ⋀x,y[E (x,y)↔ (Fx↔ Fy)] . But in this case the 'borderline zone'
were empty and the PM-series would fail to qualify as a Sorites series.
3 second thoughts
3.1 on using intuitionist weakening of double negation
First we return shortly to Bobziens exposition for citing "... S4M is a modal
companion of intuitionistic sentential logic. This links the sentential part of the
solution to intuitionistic theories of vagueness." 7
With respect to intuitionist sententential logic in view of the fact that
⊢I A→ ¬¬A, but /⊢I ¬¬A→A
one might be tempted to try a translation of the modallogic writing of a
Sorites series
 Fa1, ..., `Fai,`Fai+1, ...,¬ Fan
by a 'Sorites induction Conditional' using intuitionist (instead of classical)
material implication to the effect
Fa1, ..., ¬¬ (Fai) ,¬¬ (¬Fai+1) , ...,¬ Fan
because of/⊢I ¬¬ (Fai) → (Fai)
and /⊢I ¬¬ (¬Fai) → (¬Fai)
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3.2 on outcome concerning 'given by type' vs. 'given by
definition' controversy
The preliminary outcome of these notes on the controversy between Whewell
and Mill on whether 'natural groups are given by type, not by definition' is still
modest but, we claim, not null. As we already mentioned (see footnote), Mill,
in favour of 'given by definition' in first line refers to say predicate clusters,
but as a second line of defence takes resort to 'resemblances' in a comparative
use (resemble ... more or less ...)8 . From our point of view, Mills resort to
resemblance ( similarity, likeness, ...) will only help, if the similarity relations
invoked prove to be transitive. Therefore, at this point, Mills way of argument
seems somewhat question begging - and thus, as far as it goes - presumably will
not decide the controversy in his sense.
Notes
1see e.g. my 'Differences in Individuation and Vagueness'[3]
2while in this note we confine to Sorites, our larger cognitive interest is in the
historical struggle between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill concerning
the question, on whether 'natural groups are given by type, not by definition',
which amounts to a discussion on whether concepts 'incapable of definition' are
and may be - by best scientific practice - 'given by type' in some epistemic situ-
ations (the reference is to 'natural history', the discussed example a taxonomic
issue in botany)[6], Chapt. II,  9 ff. [pp. 121 ff.]. Mill, in making his case
for 'given by definition', refers to 'resemblance' and 'degrees of resemblance'
in addition to 'characters' [5]Chapt. VII, 4, pp. 278 ff . Of course, taxo-
nomic methodology discussion nowadays is on another level, nevertheless this
19th-century discussion seems to deserve a review in the light of contemporary
logic.
3see e.g. Krantz et alii [4], Def. 2 p.15) and chapt.3, pp.71 ff.
4 where d (x,y) is the Euclidean distance of space-points x,y, the value of
const. > 0 doesn't matter
5'First-Order Logics for Comparative Similarity'[7], pp.461-462
6"... A different approach consists in preserving the tolerance principle itself
but appealing to a nonclassical logic. The semantics originally proposed by
van Rooij belongs to that second family: it allows us to validate the tolerance
principle in its plain form, and it is non-classical. The framework rests on the
interaction of three notions of truth for sentences involving vague predicates:
the classical notion of truth, a notion of tolerant truth, and a dual notion of
strict truth. ..."[2], p. 348
7[1] p.1, and in 17 of her paper Bobzien discusses the relation of her modal
'agnostic' approach to intuitionistic theories of vagueness
5
8"The truth is, on the contrary, that every genus or family is framed with
distinct reference to certain characters, and is composed, first and principally, of
species which agree in possessing all those characters. To these are added, as a
sort of appendix, such other species, generally in small number, as possess nearly
all the properties selected; wanting some of them one property, some another,
and which, while they agree with the rest almost as much as these agree with one
another, do not resemble in an equal degree any other group. Our conception
of the class continues to be grounded on the characters ; and the class might
be defined, those things which either possess that set of characters, or resemble
the things that do so, more than they resemble anything else." Mill[5], Chapt.
VII, 4, p.282
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